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Abstract 
This paper analyses the impact of elections on the dynamics of human development in a panel of 82 
countries over the period 1980-2013. The incidence of partisan and political support effects is also 
taken into account. A GMM estimator is employed in the empirical analysis and the results point out 
to the presence of an electoral cycle in the growth rate of human development. Majority governments 
also influence it, but no clear evidence is found regarding partisan effects. The electoral cycles have 
proved to be stronger in non-OECD countries, in countries with less frequent elections, with lower 
levels of income and human development, in presidential and non-plurality systems and in 
proportional representation regimes. They have also become more intense in this millennium. 
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1. Introduction 
The existing literature on political cycles has typically focused on the economic 
policy activity of governments. It is assumed that policymakers have strong incentives to 
align policy measures with the timing of elections or/and with the electorate‟s partisan 
preferences. As such it is expected that the economy exhibits clear economic cycles that 
closely track the electoral calendar. One fundamental assumption behind all 
politico-economic models is that voters prefer those candidates that can deliver them 
greater well-being. However, behind this hypothesis there is another one very well-known 
across all areas of economics: when we improve agents‟ economic prosperity, we deliver 
them more well-being. This Maslow-based view of people‟s needs puts economic concerns 
before any others, considering that the financial well-being is the only necessary condition 
for general well-being but, nevertheless, recognizing that it is not a sufficient condition. 
More so in cases where people‟s basic economic needs are satisfied, like for most 
individuals in prosperous democracies. 
It is well known that data about GDP, income, unemployment, inflation, public debt 
and other macroeconomic aggregates does not provide information about all the important 
preferences of their real beneficiaries. Economic agents frequently value achievements such 
as better education and health services, broader participation in economic, cultural and 
political activities of the local community, improvements in working conditions and 
security against crime and physical violence, that are not necessarily reflected in higher 
income, output growth or aggregated public accounts. Hence, it seems sensible to consider 
other dimensions of development, instead of simply looking at economic variables, to draw 
the complete picture of democracy‟s effect on people‟s lives. In this paper, we try to move 
closer to the idea that governments supply more than economic well-being in exchange for 
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votes and try to find evidence that the political cycle is not limited to the economic 
dimension, and thus putting empirical research a step closer to the reality. 
Contrary to economic growth, that is simply related to quantitative changes in a 
country‟s economy, economic development involves quantitative and qualitative changes in 
a country and reflects not only economic and technological progress but also social 
relations, health conditions, education standards, personal safety and social progress. It is a 
broader measure of key determinants of human well-being. However, defining and 
measuring economic development is not straightforward. Several alternatives have been 
developed to measure it combining a few indicators of economic development (Fleurbaey, 
2009). The most commonly accepted is the Human Development Index (HDI), which was 
developed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1990. This is a broad 
measure that covers multi-dimension aspects of economic development, especially, 
education, health and income (Sen, 1999). 
This study represents a first attempt of exploring the electoral dynamics of 
well-being, taking the advantage of using a broad human development indicator that 
encompasses not only the economic, but also social dimensions of a society. This will allow 
us to answer the forgotten question of whether and how human development is affected by 
political motives and electoral calendars in both developed and developing countries. 
To proceed with this analysis, we use data over a panel of 82 countries during the 
period 1980-2013 to test for the presence of political cycles, partisanship, and government 
support effects on the growth rate of human development. A GMM estimator is employed 
in the empirical analysis and the results unveil the presence of political cycles in the human 
development: during election years human development tends to accelerate. Majority 
governments also exert a significant effect on it, but no evidence is found regarding partisan 
effects. Moreover, these political cycles are especially observed in developing countries, 
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with lower income and lower levels of HDI, and in countries with less frequent elections. 
Additional evidence shows that they have become more intense in this millennium. 
Presidential and non-plurality systems and proportional representation regimes are also 
characterized by stronger political cycles. 
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the relevant 
literature. Section 3 describes the data and presents the econometric model. The main 
results are presented and discussed in section 4. Some robustness checks are provided in 
section 5 and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
Measuring economic development and evaluating its behaviour to changes in 
economic, social, institutional and political variables has become an important task of 
several recent theoretical and empirical researches. Many studies have tried to construct 
measures of well-being. Fleurbaey (2009) summarizes three main approaches: adjusted 
GDP, happiness indices, and the Human Development Index. 
The adjusted GDP approach is based on welfare economics and aims to derive 
indicators of change in social welfare focusing on the intertemporal dimension of social 
welfare (Dasgupta, 2001). In practice, this approach relies on capital stocks as the drivers of 
changes in the intertemporal well-being of individuals. However, although theoretically 
appealing, it suffers from practical implementation problems (difficulties of generating 
comparable measurements across countries) and conceptual weaknesses (it is based on the 
theory of revealed preference). The happiness approach – which is based on evidence from 
surveys on well-being (Frei and Stutzer, 2002) – also suffers from serious problems of 
comparability across time and space. 
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The Human Development Index (HDI) has been considered a more consensual 
measure of social welfare. Indeed, the 1990 Human Development Report and the seminal 
research by Fukuda-Parr and Shiva-Kumar (2003) have set the stage for much of the 
subsequent investigation that followed. According to the Human Development Report 
(UNDP, 2014), this is a summary index (geometric mean) of three essential dimensions of 
human development: (i) long and healthy life; (ii) access to knowledge and education; and 
(iii) decent and stable living standards. Consequently, several authors emphasize the main 
features of this indicator. Ul Haq (1995) notices that it measures well-being and not just 
income by including both economic and social dimensions of well-being; additionally, its 
coverage and methodology is flexible enough to allow a measure of multi-dimensional 
well-being. Alkire (2007), Comim et al. (2008) and Molina and Purser (2010) also point out 
that the HDI allows for simple, replicable and comparable cross-country and within-country 
measures of human development. 
The HDI also presents some limitations such as weighting different aspects of life in 
the same way for all individuals, difficulties in comparing countries by other factors like 
the quality of schools or dropout rates, and the fact of the index values range between 0 and 
1 which may not well reflect the differences between countries. Nevertheless, its practical 
advantages over the alternatives make it preferable is most empirical applications. Nafziger 
(2012) considers it as a better, more complete and multifaceted measure of human 
development than any other indicator or index, being useful for the qualitative aspects of 
development. Several studies, in different fields, have used the HDI as a measure of 
economic development and to test how it reacts to changes in important economic, social 
and political variables. For example, Ranis et al. (2005) show that child mortality is highly 
correlated with HDI; Timmer and Akkus (2008) assess the gender determinants of 
long-term human development; Wolfers (2009) finds that income per capita is highly 
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correlated with HDI ranking;
1
 Davis (2009) and Martins and Veiga (2014) analyzes the 
effects of government size and the composition of public expenditure on economic 
development. 
This paper analyzes the existence of democracy related effects on the human 
development, with a special focus on the impact of elections and of government ideology. 
Due to the advantages discussed above, we use the HDI as the measure of choice to 
investigate the presence of politically induced development cycles. 
The analysis of political cycles has essentially focused on the economic sphere, i.e. 
variables like GDP, unemployment, inflation and other macroeconomic variables – along 
with fiscal and debt formation variables – have been scrutinized in the search for electoral, 
partisan and other democracy related effects (see, Franzese (2002) for an encompassing 
survey). The political business cycles and partisan theories are the main theoretical 
frameworks that indicate how governments affect macroeconomic outcomes. The political 
business cycles theories (PBC) are divided into models that assume agents with adaptive 
expectations (Nordhaus, 1975) and more recent models that adopt rational expectations 
(Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; and Rogoff, 1990). The main implication of these models is that 
all politicians implement expansionary economic policies before elections with the 
objective of maximizing their electoral support and afterwards contractionary measures are 
required to correct the artificial unbalance generated previously
2
. If the objective of 
governments is to produce more economic well-being in order to generate more votes, we 
can easily extend the PBC theory to include social dimensions. Development features like 
                                                             
1 Bloom and Friedman (1997), Bloom and Williamson (1998) and Bloom et al. (2003) also show that the drop 
in the economic dependency ratio has an impact on how human development evolves over time. 
2 Rational versions of opportunistic models tend to reduce the ability of policymaker's to induce the political 
cycle. Empirical studies suggest that favourable economic conditions do benefit governments (Hibbs, 2006). 
However, opportunistic behaviour appears to gather more support in developing countries (see, for instance, 
Shi and Svensson, 2002a,b, 2006; Brender and Drazen, 2008; and Vergne, 2009). 
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better health and education along with other social protection and personal aspects of 
people‟s lives should improve near elections. Short-term policy shifts like increases in 
expenditures in these areas can generate the typical post electoral downturn after elections 
described by the theory. Studies like Blais and Nadeau (1992), Potrafke (2010), Enkelman 
and Leibrecht (2013) and Castro and Martins (2016) report the presence of PBC cycles in 
some welfare related expenditures.
3
 However, part of the development relies on structural 
policies, for which the post-electoral effect is hard to achieve. Nevertheless, we can assume 
that some structural non-economic shifts that take longer to come in effect can be timed by 
competent governments in order to produce at least some effects near elections. 
Alternatively to the PBC theories, both the adaptive (Hibbs, 1977) and rational 
(Alesina, 1987, 1988; Alesina and Sachs, 1988) versions of the partisan theory view 
politicians as heterogeneous, arguing that different parties have different policy objectives, 
behaving, when in office, in a partisan manner. Left-wing parties are relatively more 
concerned with unemployment (growth) than with inflation, whereas right-wing parties are 
especially worried with inflation control.
4
 The effect of partisanship on the development of 
the welfare state has been widely debated and non-economic dimensions of State 
intervention like some welfare policies such as health, education and social protection have 
been considered (see Imbeau et. al. (2001) for a meta-analyses on the relationship between 
party ideology and government policies). Overall, the traditional assumption behind 
partisan effects is that left parties tend to promote the welfare intervention by the State, 
while right-wing governments are negatively correlated with State involvement in welfare. 
                                                             
3 Veiga and Veiga (2007), Drazen and Eslava (2010), Aidt et al. (2011) and Sakurai and Menezes-Filho 
(2011) also found political opportunism at aggregated and disaggregated levels of public expenditures but 
restricted to the municipal level of government. 
4
 In general, empirical evidence points out that partisan behaviour seems to be more recurrent in developed 
countries (see Alesina et al., 1992, 1997). 
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Left governments are assumed to want more state presence in people‟s lives and are 
also bigger spenders than right-wing parties. Hence, they are expected to be better providers 
of education, health and social security.
5
 However, Wilensky (1976) claims that there is a 
process of cross national convergence regardless of ideological concerns, arguing the 
industrialized countries report similar welfare states as a consequence of their similar levels 
of economic performance. 
As far as we are concerned, the presence of political cycles has never been tested in 
any indicator of human development. Nevertheless, some aspects of the relationship 
between human development and political systems have been analysed. For example, 
Gassner et. al. (2006) found that countries that have proportional systems tend to enjoy 
higher levels of human development, when compared to those with majoritarian systems. 
Also, Miller (2015) shows that the existence of elections in autocratic regimes matters for 
human development: autocratic regimes with legal multiparty elections seem to outperform 
regimes without elections with respect to a wide range of human development outcomes. 
 
3. Data and model specification 
To analyse the presence of political cycles in the human development, we collected 
annual data for 182 sovereign states over the period 1980-2013. However, the presence of 
missing values for some variables, mainly for developing countries, reduced the number of 
countries to at most 82.
6
 
The dependent variable in this analysis is the growth rate of the Human 
Development Index (HDI_gr). The HDI is a measure of the average achievement in key 
dimensions of human development, namely: (i) a long and healthy life; (ii) being 
                                                             
5 Studies that take a look at disaggregated public expenditures found none or weak support for partisan effects 
in welfare related areas. See, for instance Enkelman and Leibrecht (2013) and Castro and Martins (2016). 
6 The countries used in this study are listed in Table A.1 in Annex. 
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knowledgeable; and (iii) a decent standard of living. This index is the geometric mean of 
normalized indices for each of those three dimensions. The data for those indices and HDI 
are provided by Human Development Report of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP, 2014).
7
 
The explanatory variables included in the baseline model are the lag of HDI_gr (to 
account for the persistence in the adjustment), the set of the political variables of interest 
and some economic, institutional and demographic controllers. The political variables are 
provided by the Database of Political Institutions 2012 and by the Comparative Political 
Data Set I 2013, and are described as follows: 
- Elect_yr: a dummy variable that takes de value of 1 in the year of legislative 
elections; and 0, otherwise. A positive sign is expected for its estimated coefficient, 
meaning that political cycles are present in the growth rate of Human Development. 
- GovLeft: a dummy variable that takes de value of 1 when there is hegemony or 
dominance of left-wing parties in the cabinet; and 0, otherwise (centre or right-wing 
parties). Our expectation is that left-wing governments are more concerned with 
Human Development than their centre or right-wing counterparts. 
- GovMaj: a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a single party or coalition 
has majority in the parliament; and 0, otherwise. Majority governments have 
enough support to promote development measures; however, the power they have to 
                                                             
7 For details on how the HDI is computed, see Table A.2 in Annex and the Technical Notes of the Human 
Development Report. As the data for HDI and its three components (Life Expectancy, Education and Income 
indices) are only available for periods of five years between 1980 and 2000, the missing data were obtained 
by linear interpolation for each of the three components (more recent data are provided annually); then the 
HDI was computed as the cubic root of the product of those three components for the entire time period 
(1980-2013). A direct linear interpolation of HDI was also considered, as well as cubic and natural cubic 
spline interpolations, in some robustness checks (and shorter time periods: 1990-2013, 2000-2013, 
2005-2013). However, independently of the kind of interpolation and time period used, the results and 
conclusions of this study remain unchanged. 
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favour their own agenda and interests may not be favourable to human 
development, so no clear sign is anticipated for the coefficient on this variable. 
- GovCoal: a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a coalition government 
is in office, regardless of having majority or not; and 0, otherwise. It is also difficult 
to anticipate a sign for its coefficient, as different interests may delay important 
measures or generate a consensus for the need of their implementation. 
- MajCoal: a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a majority coalition 
government is in office; and 0, otherwise. It is equal to GovMaj*GovCoal. Once 
again, for the reasons indicated above, it is not easy to foresee the direction of its 
impact on HDI_gr. However, this is another important political dimension to be 
considered in this analysis. 
The additional set of variables includes controllers for the rating risk at economic, 
financial and political levels and for population growth. The data for the risk of rating 
variables comes from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the population data 
is obtained from the World Development Indicators. The variables are defined as follows:
8
 
- EcoRating: the economic risk rating is obtained by a weighted average of 
information on GDP per head, real GDP growth, annual inflation, budget balance 
over GDP and current account over GDP. The aim of this index is to provide 
compiled information on the general economic environment, strengths and 
weaknesses. A higher value for this index represents a better and strength economic 
environment, which is expected to have a positive impact on human development.
9
 
                                                             
8 An increase in the economic, financial or political rating risk index means an improvement in the respective 
rating risk, i.e., that the economic, financial or political environment has improved. 
9 We prefer to control for the impact of the economy using this indicator instead of GDP or income per capita 
or other related variable. As one of the components of the HDI is precisely an income index, using those 
variables as regressors would certainly be highly correlated with HDI. 
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- FinRating: The financial risk rating index includes foreign debt as a percentage of 
GDP, foreign debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services, current 
account as a percentage of exports of goods and services, net international liquidity 
as months of import cover and exchange rate stability. The aim of this risk rating is 
to provide a means of assessing a country‟s ability to pay its obligations and to 
finance its official, commercial, and trade debt obligations. We also expect that a 
better rating will mean higher development. 
- PolRating: the political risk rating includes 12 weighted variables covering both 
political and social attributes.
10
 Its aim is to provide a means of assessing the 
political stability of the countries on a comparable basis. We conjecture that a better 
rating has a positive impact on human development. 
- Pop_gr: growth rate of total population. As a high population growth brings an 
increased pressure on the management of natural resources and over the 
socio-economic relations, we believe that it may also be detrimental for the growth 
rate of human development. 
The descriptive statistics for these and other related variables – that will be 
considered in some additional specifications/experiments – are reported in Table A.3 in 
Annex. To estimate the impact of those variables on the growth rate of the human 
development index, we consider the following dynamic panel data specification: 
 
HDI_grit=α+ρHDI_grit-1+βPolit+γRatingit+δPop_grit+θTimet+vi+eit  (1) 
 
                                                             
10  The 12 components are: government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal 
conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, 
democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality. For details, see ICRG at http://www.prsgroup.com. 
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where i=1,…,82 and t=1981,…,2013. Pol and Rating represent, respectively, the vectors of 
the political and risk rating variables. The coefficient on the lag of the dependent variable 
(ρ) measures its persistence. The vector β captures the impact of the electoral cycle, partisan 
and government support effects on HDI_gr, while the vector γ assesses the effect of the 
economic, financial and political environment controllers. The impact of population growth 
is given by the coefficient δ. Additionally, we also control for the passage of time by 
including the Time variable in the specification. Regarding the last components, νi is the 
individual effect of each country i, and eit is the error term. 
Given the presence of individual effects νi, the model can be estimated assuming 
those effects as fixed or random. However, the lagged value of the dependent variable 
would be correlated with the error term, even if the latter is not serially correlated. This 
implies that OLS estimates (random or fixed effects) will be biased and inconsistent 
(Baltagi, 2008). Although the fixed effects (FE) estimator gains consistency as the number 
of time periods increases, the time-series dimension in this analysis might not be large 
enough (T=33) for us to rely entirely on its estimates.
11
 
The estimators that take into account that bias can be grouped into: (i) 
bias-corrected estimators; and (ii) instrumental variables estimators. Bias-corrected 
estimators, like the one proposed by Bruno (2005a, b) – the bias-corrected least squares 
dummy variable estimator (LSDVC) for dynamic panel data models – are suitable when the 
number of individuals (N) is small (and T is not large enough). Although T is not large in 
this study, the number of individuals cannot be considered small (N=82). Hence, this 
estimator may not be the most suitable procedure to solve the bias problem caused by the 
inclusion of the lag of the dependent variable in the list of regressors. 
                                                             
11
 Judson and Owen (1999) notice that even for T=30 the bias can be as much as 20% of the true value of the 
coefficient of interest. 
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According to the large sample properties of the generalized method of moments 
(GMM), the dynamic estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is adequate when 
there is a clear dominance of cross sections over time periods in the sample. This is what 
happens in our panel, which means that this estimator is a more appropriate procedure to 
solve the bias problem. Taking first differences of equation (1), levels of the explanatory 
variables can be used as instruments to avoid correlation between lagged dependent 
variable and the country-specific effects.
12
 Arellano and Bond (1991) also proposed a 
variant of the GMM estimator, namely the two-step estimator, which utilizes the estimated 
residuals in order to construct a consistent variance-covariance matrix of the moment 
conditions. Although the two-step estimator is asymptotically more efficient than the 
one-step estimator and relaxes the assumption of homoscedasticity, the efficiency gains are 
not that important even in the case of heteroscedastic errors. This result is supported by 
Judson and Owen (1999), who showed empirically that the one-step estimator outperforms 
the two-step estimator, especially when the number of time periods is relatively high 
(T=30), which is the case in this study. 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundel and Bond (1998) suggest another GMM 
estimator with additional moment conditions. If they are valid, they will increase the 
efficiency of the estimators. This is known as the system GMM estimator, which combines 
the moment conditions of the model in first differences with those of the model in levels 
(differences are used as instruments for the level equations). However, if the orthogonality 
conditions for the first-difference equation are valid, but those for the level equation are 
not, then the system GMM may not be better than first-differences GMM. This can happen, 
for example, if the regressors used in the orthogonality conditions for the levels equation 
                                                             
12 For this difference in GMM estimator to be consistent, it must be ensured that there is no autocorrelation in 
the errors and no correlation between individuals in the residuals. The passage of time is considered in the 
specification to overcome this problem. 
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are correlated with the individual effects. Moreover, simulations suggest that the system 
GMM is not necessarily superior to the standard GMM in cases where the autoregressive 
parameter is below 0.8 and the time-series observations are relatively large (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998; Moshirian and Wu, 2012). This is what we observe in our data, so the 
estimator that seems to be more suitable for our empirical analysis is the one-step 
first-differences GMM estimator. 
Another problem that we have to deal with is the “too many instruments problem”. 
Using too many instruments may result in over-fitting biases. When the number of time 
periods is relatively large, this over-fitting becomes even more serious. The consequent 
large collection of instruments, even if individually valid, can be collectively invalid 
because they over-fit endogenous variables (Doornik et al., 2002; Roodman, 2009a, b). 
They also weaken the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions used to check instrument 
validity. Hence, to minimize the over-fitting problem we use the collapse alternative 
suggested by Roodman (2009b). The empirical results from this panel data analysis are 
presented and discussed in the next section. 
 
4. Empirical results 
The findings of this study are reported and carefully discussed in this section. We 
start by considering several alternative estimators; then we dig deeper on the timing of 
elections and its frequency; the distinction between developed and developing countries and 
political systems is taken into account next; and some robustness checks are provided at the 
end of this section. 
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4.1. Initial estimates 
The results from the estimation of our baseline model are presented in Table 1. We 
report not only the results from the one-step and two-step differences and system-GMM 
estimators, but also the FE and LSDVC estimators (all with robust standard-errors). Despite 
our choice goes to the one-step differences-GMM estimator – for the reasons explained 
above – we consider a good practice, at this stage, to report the results of the other 
“competing” estimators. This is relevant not only to show their differences, but also – and 
more importantly – to emphasize the consistency of our main results. 
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
Looking first at the results provided by our preferred estimator (column 1), we 
observe that during election years the growth rate of human development is significantly 
higher (around 0.05 percentage points) than in non-election years.
13
 This means that the 
traditional political (business) cycles observed in GDP growth and public 
accounts/expenditures are also present in this broader dimension of well-being. This is a 
striking finding in the way it reveals the existence of an electorally determined cycle, thus 
highlighting the role of democratic features in shaping the growth path of human 
development. Nevertheless, the political orientation of the government seems to be 
innocuous for that path: left-wing governments are not more prone to promote human 
development than centre or right-wing parties. But majority governments (forming a 
coalition or not) have a marginal negative impact on the growth rate of human 
development, perhaps because they can set their own agenda without the need of reaching a 
                                                             
13
 Even though the magnitude of this effect seems small, we should note that, on average, the HDI grows very 
slowly over time. Hence, we cannot expect higher magnitudes for the estimated coefficients. 
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broader consensus from other parties, which ends up having a negative effect on general 
well-being. 
As expected, another important result to emphasize is that the economic 
environment matters for human development: an improvement in the economic risk rating 
is immediately reflected on the path of human development. However, general financial 
and political enhancements and population growth have not proved to play a significant 
role in terms of well-being. Interestingly, the growth rate of human development has shown 
to decrease over time, which indicates lower improvements in the general human 
development in the more recent years. 
These findings are robust to the choice of the kind of GMM estimator (one-step or 
two-steps; differences or system), but the system-GMM estimator has proved not to fit very 
well to the data. Contrary to the differences-GMM estimator,
14
 no persistency is found and 
the Hansen and differences-in-Hansen tests reject the validity of the instruments and the 
additional moment restrictions. Moreover, the main findings are also robust to the use of 
biased/inconsistent fixed effects estimators (static and dynamic – see columns 5 and 6 in 
Table 1), which might indicate that the bias can be negligible. In fact, correcting the bias 
with the LSDVC estimator does not generate significantly different results.
15
 Nevertheless, 
for the reasons indicated in the previous section, we proceed our analysis employing the 
one-step robust standard errors differences-GMM estimator. 
 
                                                             
14 The differences-GMM estimator requirements are fulfilled as the Hansen tests does not reject the validity 
of the instruments and there is autocorrelation in the first order but not of second order. 
15 In the LSDVC regressions, we employ the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator as the initial estimator, 
collapsing the instruments as suggested by Roodman (2009a, b). Following Bloom et al. (2007), we undertake 
50 repetitions of the procedure to bootstrap the estimated standard errors. Nevertheless, results do not 
qualitatively change with different repetitions (25, 100 or even 200). 
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4.2. Elections timing, political orientation and support, and institutional issues 
In the following set of experiments we test the sensitivity of our results to changes 
in the political variables, in the controllers and to cross effects between the variables. The 
results are presented in Table 2. We start by exploring the political cycle in greater depth, 
focusing on the timing of the elections (columns 1-3). In a first approach, we check whether 
the government‟s behaviour starts to exert any significant effect on human development 
before election years. Thus, we add to the equation a dummy variable that takes the value 
of one in the year before the elections (BefElect_yr). The results show that the electoral 
cycle over the growth rate of HDI is only present in election years, and not before. 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
Next, we replace the BefElect_yr and Elect_yr variables by a dummy that takes de 
value of one in the year after the elections, and 0 otherwise (AftElect_yr). We found this 
effect to be statistically non-significant, therefore, we reject the presence of a full or 
complete opportunistic cycle in the data. 
Additionally, instead of using dummies to control for the electoral period, we 
employ a variable that controls for the timing of the elections by measuring the proportion 
of time that has elapsed since the last election, i.e. it measures the proportion of time a 
government is in office in a particular year, since it has been elected (TimingElect).
16
 The 
results are consistent with the idea that policymakers behave opportunistically: as elections 
approach they manipulate fiscal policy to improve welfare and well-being of their 
constituents in order to increase their support and maximize their chances of winning the 
elections. Regarding the other variables, the results remain unchanged. 
                                                             
16 It is equal to 1 in the election year. 
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In the following experiments the other variables are replaced by some proxies. The 
dummy LeftGov is replaced by RightGov (which takes value one when a right-wing party is 
in office; 0 otherwise). Majority and coalition dummies are also replaced by the fraction of 
seats held by the government (Maj%, which is calculated by dividing the number of 
government seats by the total number of seats in the parliament). However, no significant 
coefficients are found for those proxies. 
Even though the political risk rating is never statistically relevant, we decided to test 
some of its components or related variables. Hence, in columns (6), we present the results 
with those that proved to be significant: the degree of democracy (Democracy, which is an 
index that represents a polity scale ranging from -10 to +10, i.e. strongly autocratic to 
strongly democratic; it is the „polity2‟ variable in the Polity IV Database); and a corruption 
index (Corruption, which is published by the ICRG and ranges from 1 to 5, i.e. low 
corruption to high corruption). The results are in line with our expectations, since more 
democracy and less corruption are beneficial for human development.
17
 However, the 
effects of these institutional components of the political environment have not proved to be 
consistent. For example, when we add a variable to control for the size of government 
(GovSize) their statistical significance vanishes. Moreover, the size of government also 
appears not to influence the growth rate of human development in the group of 55 countries 
for which the data is available.
18
 
In column (8) we report a regression with a composite risk rating (CompRisk) 
computed using the economic, financial and political risk rating variables. This composite 
rating is computed by the ICRG. The political risk rating contributes 50% of the composite 
                                                             
17 Aidt (2011) provides evidence of a negative impact of corruption on sustainable development. 
18
 GovSize is the „fi_sog‟ index in the Economic Freedom of the World published by the Fraser Institute. 
Despite those effects are not relevant in our sample, Martins and Veiga (2014) have found a significant impact 
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rating, while the financial and economic risk ratings each contribute 25%. The results 
indicate that the better the general economic, financial and political environment is, the 
more the human development grows. However, we can easily conclude that this effect is 
mostly due to improvements in the economic conditions. 
In general, despite all these experiments, our main findings remain valid: elections 
and economic environment have a positive impact on the growth rate of human 
development, while majority governments tend to exert a negative influence. Additionally, 
to account for the possibility of the risk rating variables not being exogenous, we treat them 
as endogenous in the last regression in Table 2. Nevertheless, our results are not affected.
19
 
 
4.3. Frequency of elections 
Another important issue to be considered in this analysis is whether the frequency of 
elections can affect the political cycle in the human development. Are longer cycles 
responsible for more opportunism than shorter cycles? Can human development benefit 
from low or high frequency elections? What „kind of democracy‟ might be better? To get 
some clues on how to answer these complex questions we have to find a way of identifying 
countries with different frequencies of elections. The most practical way is to divide them 
according to the average duration of mandates: one with low durations (high frequency); 
the other with high durations (low frequency). 
The next challenge is to define the threshold between high and low frequencies. A 
very straightforward solution is to consider the average duration among the panel of 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
of government size on human development in a larger panel of 156 countries and using a convergence 
specification with 5-year time spans. Our sample only includes countries with established democracies. 
19 We also tried to test for the presence of interaction effects between Elect_yr and GovLeft, GovMaj and 
EcoRating, but the respective coefficients were always statistically insignificant. Those results are not 
reported here to save space, but they are available upon request. 
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countries used in our analysis: 3.8 years.
20
 Thus, we can estimate one model for the group 
of countries that present a high frequency of elections (average duration of mandates lower 
that 3.8 years), and other for the group with a lower frequency of elections (duration higher 
or equal to 3.8 years). The respective results are presented in columns (1) and (2) in Table 
3. They are very clear in pointing out that political cycles are a characteristic of countries 
where governments‟ mandates are longer. 21  These provide the necessary time for 
policymakers to develop and implement the (opportunistic) measures that will promote a 
significant increase in well-being, precisely when they need to maximize their political 
support, i.e. in the election years. As longer mandates are mainly a consequence of political 
stability, our results indicate that more politically stable democracies seem to be more 
prone to opportunistic manipulation. This is also consistent with the notion that some 
development measures are not short-term based, thus requiring more time to be 
implemented. 
 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
This finding is confirmed when we run a regression with all countries but 
distinguishing elections in countries where they are more frequent (multiplying Elect_yr 
with the dummy MoreFreq that takes the value of one in countries with an average duration 
                                                             
20 Another option could be to consider differences in the constitutional duration of terms in each country. 
However, we would face the problem that, in general, they are not very different (they are usually set at four 
years, which is indeed quite close form the average of 3.8 years), so we will have almost all countries in only 
one group; moreover, there are several cases in which mandates end up being shorter than expected because 
governments have not enough political support to stay in office. Thus, due to these practical issues, we opted 
by using the average threshold. 
21
 For the countries in each sub-sample see Table A.1 in Annex. As the number of countries is low when we 
split the sample, an LSDVC was also used. The results have proved to be very similar; they are not presented 
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of mandates lower than 3.8 years: Elect*MoreFreq) from elections in countries where they 
are less frequent (multiplying Elect_yr with the dummy LessFreq that takes the value of 
one in countries with an average duration of mandates higher than 3.8 years: 
Elect*LessFreq). We also test whether the difference in the coefficients is significant 
(Diff_ElectFreq). Even though the difference is not statistically significant, only countries 
where governments have longer mandates present a significant political cycle on human 
development. This same conclusion is obtained if we replace Elect_yr by TimingElect and 
multiply it by MoreFreq (Timing*MoreFreq) and LessFreq (Timing*LessFreq). 
These results have also proved to be robust to small changes in the threshold. We 
tried other ad hoc thresholds at 3.5, 3.6, 4, and 4.2 years but the results described above 
remained qualitatively unchanged.
22
 We also report the results using as threshold for the 
frequency of elections the mean duration of mandates observed in the sub-group of OECD 
countries (i.e. 3.4 years – see columns 5-8), which are also the most developed countries in 
our sample. The results are in line with the ones reported above, pointing out to a clear 
political cycle in the countries with less frequent elections (i.e. frequency higher than 3.4 
years). In this case, we are able to unveil a significant difference between the two groups of 
countries when the variable TimingElect multiplied by the dummies for the frequency of 
elections is employed. 
An additional and striking finding that emerges from this analysis is that majority 
governments are especially detrimental for human development in countries with a high 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
here to save space, but they are available upon request. Note that regression (3) in Table 3 is another way of 
checking the consistency of the results, while keeping the entire sample. 
22 At 4.5 years, the significance for countries with less frequent elections decreases; however, the number of 
countries in that sub-sample also decreases dramatically. All mentioned results are not reported here, but are 
available upon request. 
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frequency of elections (see columns 1 and 2).
23
 This might mean that as their expected time 
horizon in office is shorter, they will tend to look at their short-term interests in detriment 
of „building‟ more long-term policies associated with non-economic aspects of 
development. Apart from the fact that economic environment matters for human 
development in any of the cases, no other relevant results are found. Nevertheless, there 
may be some results found in this subsection that are potentially tied to the characteristics 
of the political systems. As political systems features are constant over our time span and, 
therefore, cannot be controlled for in the previous estimations, in the next subsection we 
pay a close attention to the impact of different political designs on human development. 
 
4.4. Advanced vs developing economies and political systems 
The literature on political business cycles has demonstrated that the opportunistic 
behaviour tends to gather more support in developing countries than in advanced 
economies (Shi and Svensson, 2006; Brender and Drazen, 2005, 2008; Vergne, 2009). To 
account for this issue in the human development, we separate the analysis in two 
sub-groups of countries: OECD countries (representing the advanced economies); and 
non-OECD countries (encompassing all the other less developed or developing economies). 
Moreover, we also distinguish high-income countries (HIC) from countries with lower 
income (LIC) and between countries with a high-HDI (HHDIC) and low-HDI (LHDIC).
24
 
The results are presented in Table 4. 
 
                                                             
23 This finding is observed when we use the 3.8 years threshold but not with the 3.4 years threshold, maybe 
because in the second case the number of majority government is residual. 
24 For the countries in each sub-sample see Table A.1 in Annex. High-income countries are those are those 
that, according to the World Bank in 2014, have a GNI per capita of $12,736 or more. For the high-HDI group 
are considered those countries that, according to the United Nations Development Program, have an HDI 
higher than 0.800. 
  23 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
 
The results for the group of OECD countries are shown first, followed by the ones 
for non-OECD or less developed economies (see columns 1 and 2). Despite economic 
conditions being important in both sub-sets, we corroborate the idea that governments‟ 
opportunistic behaviour is a characteristic of less developed countries. In particular, human 
development rises more significantly during election periods in those economies than in 
more advanced ones. The effect in the OECD countries is almost negligible. When dummy 
variables are used to identify the two sets of countries and multiplied by Elect_yr 
(Elect*OECD and Elect*NonOECD) – in a similar way to what we have done in Table 3 
for the frequency of elections – we confirm the prominence of political cycles in the human 
development for non-OECD economies and that the difference to the group of OECD 
countries is statistically significant (see coefficient on Diff_OECD). 
Identical approaches are used in the distinctions regarding income and HDI. The 
results reported in columns (4) to (9) are in line with the previous ones, in the sense that 
they show that countries with lower income and HDI are the ones in which the timing of 
the elections matter for the evolution of human development, with a significant difference 
relatively to the other groups (HIC or HHDIC).
25
 On the contrary, majority governments‟ 
behaviour seems to be detrimental to human development only in countries with a higher 
income and HDI. 
                                                             
25 The HIC, LIC, HHDIC and LHDIC variables in the specifications (multiplied by Elect_yr) are dummies 
that take the value of one if a country belongs to that group (the differences between the respective 
coefficients are given by Diff_IC and Diff_HDI). An LSDVC estimator was also used for each sub-sample, 
but the results did not change. They are not shown here to save space, but they are available upon request. 
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The type of political regime/system may also play a role on how human 
development behaves.
26
 Issues like whether the system is presidential or not, whether there 
is plurality or not, and whether there is proportional representation or not deserve to be 
considered as different political systems can generate different outcomes. As these 
characteristics of the electoral design do not exhibit time variability we cannot explicitly 
include them in the model to control for their impact, because they are dropped in the 
GMM estimations. Thus, the alternative is to estimate separate regressions for each kind of 
political system/regime. Additionally, we can also evaluate the significance of the 
differences in the political cycle behaviour (Diff_#) by looking at the impact of the product 
between Elect_yr and a dummy for the respective regime (Elect*Presid and 
Elect*NonPresid; Elect*Plural and Elect*NonPlural; Elect*PR and Elect*NonPR), in a 
similar way to what we have done above.
27
 The results for the respective estimations are 
presented in Table 5. 
 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
Presidential and non-plurality regimes and proportional representation systems are 
the ones in which human development exhibits an electoral cycle. These results are in line 
with the works of Persson and Tabellini (2002) and Gassner et. al. (2006). However, the 
difference for their counterpart systems/regimes has not proved to be very relevant (see 
                                                             
26 For example, Persson and Tabellini (2002) and and Gassner et. al. (2006) show that electoral cycles differ 
across political systems. 
27 Presid takes de value of one in presidential systems, i.e. when the head of government is also head of state 
and leads an executive branch separated from the legislative branch, and 0 otherwise (NonPresid). Plural 
takes the value of one in plurality systems, i.e. when legislators are elected using a „winner-take-all‟ rule, and 
0 otherwise (NonPlural). PR takes the value of one in proportional representation regimes, i.e. in those 
regimes in which candidates are elected based on the percent of votes received by their party, and 0 otherwise 
(NonPR). For details on the countries in each system/regime, see Table A.1 in Annex. 
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coefficients on Diff_#, for each case) and partisan effects remain absent from all 
estimations. 
We also verify that despite economic conditions matter independently of the kind of 
political system/regime, majority governments tend to be more “active” in non-plurality 
systems and in proportional representation regimes. 
 
4.5. Robustness checks 
As the data for HDI and its three components (Life Expectancy, Education and 
Income indices) are only available for periods of five years between 1980 and 2000, the 
missing data were obtained by linear interpolation for each of its three components. The 
HDI was then computed as the cubic root of the product of those three components for the 
entire time period (1980-2013). To check for the robustness of our results, we present some 
additional regressions where different kinds of interpolations to obtain the missing values 
for HDI are used, as well as different time periods. The results are presented in Table 6. 
 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
 
As the evolution of HDI and its components follows a relative stable and smooth 
path, the linear interpolation seems to be a reasonable option. Thus, despite our preferable 
choice of indirect linear interpolation used above, a direct linear interpolation of HDI series 
was also considered (see column 1 in Table 6). Additional regressions with cubic and 
natural cubic spline interpolations for the missing values of HDI are provided (see columns 
2 and 3). To circumvent any remaining issues with interpolation, we also report estimations 
for shorter and more recent time periods (where fewer years are interpolated or where there 
is no interpolation at all): 1990-2013, 2000-2013, and 2005-2013 (see columns 4 to 10). 
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Independently of the kind of interpolation or time period considered, the results and 
conclusions of this study remain unchanged. Despite the estimates with different kinds of 
interpolation do not offer any further insights, something more can be said regarding the 
cases in which we restrict the time period. First, for the period after 2004 no persistence is 
found, so a FE estimator is considered in regression (7). Second, the magnitude of the 
coefficient on Elect_yr increases as we restrict the time period to more recent years, which 
points out to an intensification of political cycle over time. Third, this effect is concentrated 
in the group of non-OECD (or less developed) countries, as shown in column (8). Lastly, 
regressions in columns (9) and (10) not only confirm that the political cycle on human 
development have become stronger in the recent years, but also show a significant 
difference relatively to the previous periods (before 2000 and before 2005).
28
 
In sum, we find consistent evidence that policymakers‟ opportunistic behaviour 
encompasses some social concerns, which has contributed to boost human development, 
especially in developing (or less developed) countries, a phenomenon that has become more 
intense in this millennium. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study represents a first attempt of analysing the role of democratic features in 
the shaping of human development‟s growth path. The traditional analysis of political 
cycles has focused essentially on the business or economic cycle, and assumes that 
governments are only interested in providing economic well-being, thus neglecting other 
relevant dimensions that economic agents tend to value like better education and health 
services, broader participation in economic, cultural and political activities of the local 
                                                             
28 See the coefficients on Diff_DYr00 and Diff_DYr05, where DYr00 is a dummy that takes the value of one 
in the years after 1999 (it is the same as DYr>1999), and 0 otherwise (DYr<2000); and DYr04 is a dummy 
that takes the value of one in the years after 2004 (it is the same as DYr>2004), and 0 otherwise (DYr<2005). 
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community, improvements in working conditions and security against crime and physical 
violence. Since the HDI, developed by the United Nations (UNDP), covers 
multi-dimension aspects of economic development, we use it to analyse the electoral 
dynamics of human development. 
Using data for 82 countries over the period 1980-2013 and employing a GMM 
estimator we were able to identify the presence of a political development cycle. During 
election years the growth rate of human development is significantly higher than in 
non-election years. It seems that governments near elections deliver more than strict 
economic well-being, and thus the standard economic cycle found in the literature is only a 
part of the actual socio-economic cycle generated by elections. We also found that the 
electoral cycle over the growth rate of HDI is only present in election years, nothing was 
found before or after, and that this cycle has become stronger in the recent years. This 
might mean that, as countries prosperity increases over time, politicians are more aware of 
voters‟ social preferences and the increasing value they put on non-economic well-being. 
Our results provide no evidence of left-wing governments being more prone to 
promote human development than other types of rulers. The political orientation of 
governments was consistently found to be innocuous for the growth path of human 
development. On the contrary, majority governments seem be associated with a decrease in 
the growth rate of human development. 
A further detailed analysis accounting for some important characteristics of 
democracies showed that human development rises more significantly during election 
periods in less developed countries than in more advanced ones (the effect found for OECD 
countries is almost negligible). Moreover, the opportunistic development cycle seems to be 
a characteristic of countries where government mandates are longer and of proportional 
representation systems. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Political cycles in the growth rate of human development 
 DifGMM1 DifGMM2 SysGMM1 SysGMM2 Static-FE Dyn-FE LSDVC 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) 
        
L.HDI_gr 0.376*** 0.329*** 0.189 0.156  0.352** 0.403*** 
 (0.097) (0.108) (0.150) (0.146)  (0.156) (0.024) 
Elect_yr 0.054** 0.037** 0.051** 0.035** 0.048** 0.053** 0.054** 
 (0.025) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020) (0.023) (0.027) 
GovLeft 0.003 -0.001 -0.007 -0.002 -0.049 -0.032 -0.030 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.032) (0.037) (0.032) (0.020) (0.030) 
GovMaj -0.152* -0.116 -0.136 -0.088 -0.210** -0.155** -0.145*** 
 (0.083) (0.076) (0.086) (0.081) (0.084) (0.061) (0.045) 
GovCoal -0.079 -0.064 -0.080 -0.050 -0.096 -0.066 -0.062 
 (0.084) (0.083) (0.077) (0.081) (0.065) (0.047) (0.038) 
MajCoal 0.091 0.055 0.094 0.046 0.163* 0.123** 0.114** 
 (0.085) (0.086) (0.083) (0.083) (0.089) (0.062) (0.055) 
EcoRating 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
FinRating 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.006* 0.003 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
PolRating -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Pop_gr -0.044 -0.042 -0.044 -0.040 -0.016 -0.022** -0.019 
 (0.035) (0.052) (0.035) (0.052) (0.014) (0.011) (0.016) 
Time -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.010*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
        
        
R2     0.087 0.194  
# Observations 1616 1616 1717 1717 1719 1717 1717 
# Countries 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 
# Instruments 40 40 42 42    
Hansen J-test 0.147 0.147 0.032 0.032    
Diff. Hansen test   0.081 0.081    
AR(1) 0.007 0.017 0.000 0.042    
AR(2) 0.802 0.876 0.824 0.770    
        
Notes: See Tables A.1 and A.2 in Annex. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at 
which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. One-step and two-steps differences and 
system GMM estimates are reported in columns (1)-(4); columns (5) and (6) report the results for static and 
dynamic fixed effects estimators, respectively. Bruno‟s (2005a, b) LSDVC estimates are shown in the last 
column. The lagged dependent regressor is treated as endogenous in the GMM estimations; their lagged 
values and the other explanatory variables are used as instruments in the first-difference equation; the lagged 
first-differences of the lagged dependent variable were also used in the levels equation in the system GMM 
estimations; they were collapsed to avoid the problem of having too many instruments. The Hansen J-test 
reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen 
test are the p-values for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for the system GMM. The 
values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for first and second order auto-correlated disturbances 
in the first differences equations. 
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Table 2. Elections timing, political orientation and support, and institutional issues 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
L.HDI_gr 0.313*** 0.383*** 0.427*** 0.366*** 0.371*** 0.420*** 0.382*** 0.393*** 0.303** 
 (0.106) (0.092) (0.097) (0.101) (0.095) (0.098) (0.092) (0.097) (0.121) 
Elect_yr 0.053***   0.039** 0.054** 0.042** 0.041** 0.048** 0.051** 
 (0.016)   (0.020) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023) 
BefElect_yr -0.010         
 (0.032)         
AftElect_yr  -0.018        
  (0.016)        
TimingElect   0.060**       
   (0.025)       
GovLeft -0.010 -0.013 0.018  0.013 0.006 -0.004 -0.008 -0.026 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.029)  (0.036) (0.032) (0.033) (0.037) (0.037) 
GovRight    0.020      
    (0.035)      
GovMaj -0.177** -0.151* -0.130* -0.157*  -0.215** -0.247** -0.147* -0.170** 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.078) (0.087)  (0.101) (0.104) (0.087) (0.077) 
GovCoal -0.079 -0.072 0.019 -0.097  -0.052 -0.077 -0.095 -0.050 
 (0.081) (0.085) (0.056) (0.092)  (0.094) (0.094) (0.087) (0.079) 
MajCoal 0.112 0.083 0.050 0.107  0.119 0.153 0.090 0.122 
 (0.081) (0.084) (0.077) (0.087)  (0.097) (0.095) (0.090) (0.084) 
Maj%     -0.099     
     (0.157)     
EcoRating 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.030*** 0.026*** 0.024***  0.025*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.005) 
FinRating 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.001  0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) 
PolRating -0.005 -0.002 -0.007 0.001 -0.003    0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)    (0.004) 
Democracy      0.051* 0.041   
      (0.027) (0.026)   
Corruption      -0.047* -0.039   
      (0.028) (0.027)   
GovSize       0.024   
       (0.037)   
CompRating        0.017***  
        (0.004)  
Pop_gr -0.033 -0.049 -0.049 -0.026 -0.049 -0.052 -0.071 -0.047 -0.058 
 (0.034) (0.037) (0.039) (0.028) (0.034) (0.079) (0.084) (0.035) (0.038) 
Time -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.007** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
          
          
#Observations 1572 1584 1539 1503 1620 1134 1081 1616 1616 
#Countries 81 82 82 81 82 56 55 82 82 
#Instruments 41 40 40 40 38 41 41 38 121 
Hansen J-test 0.168 0.140 0.138 0.140 0.141 0.221 0.147 0.163 0.894 
AR(1) 0.003 0.007 0.011 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.001 
AR(2) 0.935 0.825 0.749 0.765 0.831 0.650 0.568 0.729 0.907 
          
Notes: See Table 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. The one-step difference-GMM estimator is employed in all estimations. The 
lagged dependent regressor is treated as endogenous (in regression 9 the economic, financial and political risk 
rating variables are also treated as endogenous); their lagged values and the other explanatory variables are used as 
instruments in the first-difference equation; they were collapsed to avoid the problem of having too many 
instruments. The Hansen J-test reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values 
reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for first and second order auto-correlated disturbances in the first 
differences equations. 
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Table 3. Frequency of elections 
 Average frequency of all countries Average frequency of OECD countries 
 < 3.8 yrs > 3.8 yrs Elect3.8 Timing3.8 < 3.4 yrs > 3.4 yrs Elect3.4 Timing3.4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
L.HDI_gr 0.308* 0.365*** 0.377*** 0.431*** 0.578*** 0.333*** 0.377*** 0.430*** 
 (0.187) (0.124) (0.096) (0.097) (0.081) (0.115) (0.096) (0.097) 
Elect_yr 0.049 0.070**   0.026 0.077**   
 (0.034) (0.035)   (0.023) (0.038)   
Elect*MoreFreq   0.045    0.025  
   (0.034)    (0.020)  
Elect*LessFreq   0.067**    0.075**  
   (0.034)    (0.038)  
Diff_ElectFreq   -0.022    -0.050  
   (0.048)    (0.041)  
Timing*MoreFreq    0.033    0.007 
    (0.032)    (0.027) 
Timing*LessFreq    0.097***    0.094*** 
    (0.032)    (0.032) 
Diff_TimingFreq    -0.064    -0.087** 
    (0.042)    (0.039) 
GovLeft 0.030 -0.021 0.003 0.018 -0.016 0.020 0.004 0.018 
 (0.032) (0.072) (0.038) (0.029) (0.036) (0.054) (0.038) (0.029) 
GovMaj -0.144*** -0.153 -0.151* -0.130* -0.116 -0.165 -0.152* -0.130* 
 (0.050) (0.175) (0.082) (0.078) (0.072) (0.134) (0.083) (0.078) 
GovCoal -0.021 -0.165 -0.077 0.021 0.022 -0.146 -0.079 0.021 
 (0.059) (0.164) (0.083) (0.056) (0.072) (0.140) (0.083) (0.056) 
MajCoal 0.091 0.124 0.089 0.048 0.002 0.141 0.091 0.049 
 (0.069) (0.163) (0.084) (0.077) (0.104) (0.130) (0.085) (0.077) 
EcoRating 0.032** 0.024*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) 
FinRating -0.001 0.010 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.004 0.001 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
PolRating -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
Pop_gr -0.047 -0.001 -0.044 -0.050 -0.156 -0.021 -0.043 -0.050 
 (0.053) (0.019) (0.035) (0.039) (0.114) (0.029) (0.035) (0.040) 
Time -0.017*** -0.016** -0.013*** -0.008** -0.010*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.008** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
         
         
# Observations 749 867 1616 1539 410 1126 1616 1539 
# Countries 32 50 82 82 21 61 82 82 
# Instruments 40 40 41 41 40 40 41 41 
Hansen J-test 0.272 0.420 0.148 0.138 0.883 0.391 0.154 0.139 
AR(1) 0.074 0.000 0.007 0.011 0.000 0.019 0.007 0.011 
AR(2) 0.632 0.794 0.808 0.764 0.896 0.839 0.822 0.739 
         
Notes: See Tables 1 and 2, and Table A.2 in Annex. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at 
which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. The one-step difference-GMM estimator is 
employed in all estimations. The lagged dependent regressor is treated as endogenous; their lagged values and the 
other explanatory variables are used as instruments in the first-difference equation; they were collapsed to avoid the 
problem of having too many instruments. The Hansen J-test reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of 
instrument validity. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for first and second order 
auto-correlated disturbances in the first differences equations. When the number of countries is low (when the 
sample is split), an LSDVC estimator was also used, but the results were similar; they are not reported here, but 
they are available upon request. 
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Table 4. Advanced economies, income and human development 
 OECD vs Non-OECD countries High vs Low Income countries High vs Low HDI countries 
 OECD NonOECD Dummy HIC LIC Dummy HHDIC LHDIC Dummy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
L.HDI_gr 0.398*** 0.395*** 0.378*** 0.499*** 0.322*** 0.380*** 0.515*** 0.316*** 0.381*** 
 (0.063) (0.118) (0.096) (0.059) (0.123) (0.095) (0.066) (0.120) (0.095) 
Elect_yr 0.008 0.099**  0.008 0.116**  0.010 0.111**  
 (0.018) (0.046)  (0.017) (0.053)  (0.018) (0.050)  
Elect*OECD   0.016       
   (0.018)       
Elect*NonOECD   0.094**       
   (0.045)       
Diff_OECD   -0.078*       
   (0.047)       
Elect*HIC      0.017    
      (0.015)    
Elect*LIC      0.116**    
      (0.056)    
Diff_IC      -0.099*    
      (0.056)    
Elect*HHDIC         0.015 
         (0.016) 
Elect*LHDIC         0.109** 
         (0.052) 
Diff_HDIC         -0.094* 
         (0.053) 
GovLeft -0.017 0.031 -0.003 -0.034 0.068 0.001 -0.017 0.062 -0.001 
 (0.042) (0.060) (0.038) (0.042) (0.057) (0.038) (0.045) (0.055) (0.038) 
GovMaj -0.087* -0.234* -0.148* -0.133** -0.235 -0.153* -0.148*** -0.237 -0.153* 
 (0.052) (0.130) (0.082) (0.052) (0.165) (0.083) (0.051) (0.159) (0.083) 
GovCoal 0.032 -0.149 -0.079 0.019 -0.171 -0.080 0.006 -0.160 -0.079 
 (0.053) (0.127) (0.083) (0.046) (0.168) (0.083) (0.048) (0.162) (0.083) 
MajCoal 0.025 0.174 0.088 0.039 0.171 0.090 0.103* 0.165 0.091 
 (0.057) (0.139) (0.085) (0.064) (0.174) (0.085) (0.057) (0.168) (0.086) 
EcoRating 0.024*** 0.035** 0.030*** 0.020** 0.043*** 0.030*** 0.017* 0.041*** 0.030*** 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) 
FinRating 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
PolRating 0.002 -0.008 -0.003 0.006* -0.015 -0.003 0.004 -0.012 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) 
Pop_gr -0.041 -0.047 -0.041 -0.009 -0.341* -0.046 -0.003 -0.345** -0.045 
 (0.077) (0.042) (0.035) (0.024) (0.191) (0.036) (0.023) (0.143) (0.036) 
Time -0.015*** -0.014* -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.025*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.024*** -0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) 
          
          
# Observations 837 779 1616 924 692 1616 892 720 1616 
# Countries 34 48 82 41 41 82 37 45 82 
# Instruments 40 40 41 40 40 41 40 40 41 
Hansen J-test 0.418 0.206 0.146 0.239 0.405 0.146 0.212 0.306 0.155 
AR(1) 0.000 0.024 0.007 0.000 0.033 0.007 0.000 0.030 0.007 
AR(2) 0.681 0.880 0.797 0.973 0.961 0.817 0.681 0.844 0.809 
          
Notes: See Tables 1-3 and respective notes; see also Table A.2 in Annex. High-income countries (HIC) are those 
are those that, according to the World Bank, have a GNI per capita of $12,736 or more; the other economies (LIC) 
are the group of countries with lower income (see http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups, for 
details). For the high-HDI group (HHDIC) are considered those countries that, according to the United Nations 
Development Program, have an HDI higher than 0.800; the others (LHDIC) have a lower HDI (For further details, 
see http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-1-human-development-index-and-its-components). 
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Table 5. Presidential systems, plurality systems and proportional representation 
 Presidential vs Non-Presidential Plurarily vs Non-Plurality Prop.Representation vs Non-PR 
 Presid NonPresid Dummy Plural NonPlural Dummy PR NonPR Dummy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
L.HDI_gr 0.229* 0.472*** 0.377*** 0.342*** 0.433** 0.376*** 0.490*** 0.183 0.375*** 
 (0.119) (0.180) (0.096) (0.122) (0.177) (0.097) (0.106) (0.142) (0.097) 
Elect_yr 0.061* 0.045  0.059 0.041*  0.057** 0.043  
 (0.032) (0.034)  (0.039) (0.023)  (0.029) (0.049)  
Elect*Presid   0.062*       
   (0.036)       
Elect*NonPresid   0.049       
   (0.033)       
Diff_Presid   0.014       
   (0.046)       
Elect*Plural      0.060    
      (0.040)    
Elect*NonPlural      0.049**    
      (0.023)    
Diff_Plural      0.011    
      (0.044)    
Elect*PR         0.055** 
         (0.027) 
Elect*NonPR         0.052 
         (0.058) 
Diff_PR         0.003 
         (0.062) 
GovLeft 0.001 0.042 0.002 -0.002 -0.022 0.003 0.015 0.001 0.002 
 (0.074) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.069) (0.039) (0.047) (0.083) (0.038) 
GovMaj -0.220 -0.040 -0.151* -0.130 -0.156** -0.152* -0.134** -0.348 -0.151* 
 (0.145) (0.056) (0.082) (0.123) (0.072) (0.084) (0.055) (0.343) (0.085) 
GovCoal -0.185 -0.001 -0.078 0.043 -0.148 -0.079 -0.027 -0.491 -0.078 
 (0.150) (0.057) (0.084) (0.115) (0.125) (0.084) (0.080) (0.468) (0.084) 
MajCoal 0.198 -0.001 0.090 -0.005 0.145 0.090 0.082 0.232 0.090 
 (0.150) (0.074) (0.084) (0.121) (0.092) (0.085) (0.069) (0.382) (0.086) 
EcoRating 0.025*** 0.031** 0.030*** 0.040*** 0.017** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.025** 0.030*** 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) 
FinRating 0.009 -0.006 0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.001 -0.002 0.011 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) 
PolRating -0.009* -0.002 -0.003 -0.011 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.012 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) 
Pop_gr 0.012 -0.100 -0.044 -0.046 -0.041 -0.043 -0.036 -0.099 -0.044 
 (0.022) (0.072) (0.035) (0.042) (0.063) (0.035) (0.032) (0.165) (0.035) 
Time -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.006 -0.018*** -0.012*** -0.015*** 0.006 -0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) 
          
          
# Observations 771 844 1615 857 754 1611 1308 304 1612 
# Countries 46 36 82 46 35 81 62 19 81 
# Instruments 40 40 41 40 40 41 40 17 41 
Hansen J-test 0.308 0.251 0.149 0.175 0.206 0.143 0.212 0.262 0.141 
AR(1) 0.000 0.050 0.007 0.047 0.001 0.007 0.022 0.006 0.006 
AR(2) 0.954 0.853 0.798 0.347 0.075 0.798 0.139 0.387 0.800 
          
Notes: See Tables 1-4 and respective notes; see also Table A.2 in Annex. In regression (8) instruments for the 
dependent variable are collapsed and reduced to a maximum of 7 lags. The sample is split in subgroups of 
presidential and non-presidential, plurality and non-plurality systems, and countries with and without proportional 
representation regimes. In a presidential system the head of government is also head of state and leads an executive 
branch separated from the legislative branch. In plurality systems legislators are elected using a „winner-take-all‟ 
rule. Proportional representation regimes elect candidates based on the percent of votes received by their party. 
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Table 6. Robustness checks 
 DirIpol CubIPol SplIpol Yr>1989 Yr>1999 Yr>2004 >04FE >04FEc DYr00 DYr05 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
L.HDI_gr_DirIpol 0.371***          
 (0.100)          
L.HDI_gr_CubIpol  0.437***         
  (0.110)         
L.HDI_gr_SplIpol   0.639***        
   (0.100)        
L.HDI_gr    0.336*** 0.248** 0.108   0.379*** 0.377*** 
    (0.100) (0.103) (0.100)   (0.096) (0.096) 
Elect_yr 0.054** 0.062** 0.050** 0.062** 0.090** 0.120** 0.130**    
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.028) (0.044) (0.058) (0.064)    
Elect*OECD        0.032   
        (0.038)   
Elect*NonOECD        0.219**   
        (0.110)   
Diff_OECD        -0.187*   
        (0.111)   
Elect*DYr>1999         0.103**  
         (0.048)  
Elect*DYr<2000         0.005  
         (0.012)  
Diff_DYr00         0.099**  
         (0.049)  
Elect*DYr>2004          0.144** 
          (0.073) 
Elect*DYr<2005          0.013 
          (0.013) 
Diff_DYr05          0.131* 
          (0.074) 
GovLeft 0.001 -0.018 -0.017 0.005 0.046 0.069 0.124* 0.122* -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.038) (0.042) (0.044) (0.041) (0.066) (0.071) (0.066) (0.065) (0.038) (0.038) 
GovMaj -0.160* -0.163* -0.173* -0.162* -0.210* -0.273 -0.261** -0.239** -0.151* -0.145* 
 (0.082) (0.096) (0.095) (0.093) (0.117) (0.190) (0.114) (0.117) (0.083) (0.083) 
GovCoal -0.082 -0.062 -0.128 -0.076 -0.130 -0.144 -0.143 -0.137 -0.084 -0.078 
 (0.083) (0.093) (0.099) (0.088) (0.128) (0.187) (0.108) (0.109) (0.084) (0.083) 
MajCoal 0.099 0.087 0.124 0.103 0.127 0.163 0.264** 0.243* 0.087 0.087 
 (0.084) (0.101) (0.102) (0.095) (0.127) (0.182) (0.120) (0.125) (0.086) (0.085) 
EcoRating 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.047*** 0.052*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) 
FinRating 0.001 0.001 0.0010 -0.001 -0.002 -0.014 -0.007 -0.007 0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) 
PolRating -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.011 0.009 0.010 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.005) (0.005) 
Pop_gr -0.044 -0.032 -0.048 -0.049 -0.059 -0.039 0.029 0.031 -0.039 -0.045 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.032) (0.037) (0.047) (0.058) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.035) 
Time -0.013*** -0.017*** -0.008* -0.013*** -0.016** -0.021 -0.026** -0.026** -0.013*** -0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) 
           
           
R2       0.114 0.120   
# Observations 1616 1457 1616 1414 854 526 535 535 1616 1616 
# Countries 82 81 82 81 78 72 72 72 82 82 
# Instruments 40 35 40 40 40 40   41 41 
Hansen J-test 0.150 0.125 0.178 0.182 0.139 0.165   0.154 0.156 
AR(1) 0.007 0.016 0.014 0.009 0.015 0.031   0.006 0.007 
AR(2) 0.811 0.975 0.786 0.862 0.881 0.581   0.832 0.867 
           
Notes: See Tables 1-5 and the respective notes. In regressions (1)-(3) the missing values for the dependent variable 
were obtained by direct interpolation of HDI, cubic interpolation and natural cubic spline interpolation, 
respectively. In regressions (4)-(8), the sample is restricted to the years after 1989, 1999 and 2004, respectively. 
The estimates in columns (7) and (8) were obtained using a fixed effects estimator. Dummies for the periods before 
and after years 2000 and 2005, respectively, are considered in regressions (9) and (10). 
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ANNEX 
 
Table A1. List of Countries 
 
Countries used in the estimations (82 countries): 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, 
Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, and Zambia. 
 
Countries with frequency of elections lower than 3.8 years (32 countries): 
Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United States. 
 
Countries with frequency of elections lower than 3.4 years (21 countries): 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Greece, Japan, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United States. 
 
OECD countries (34 countries): 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
 
High-income countries (41 countries): 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
 
High-HDI countries (37 countries): 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and 
the United States. 
 
Presidential systems (46 countries): 
Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Korea, Malawi, Mali, 
Mexico, Moldova, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zambia. 
 
Plurality systems (46 countries): 
Albania, Australia, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, India, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, 
Latvia, Malawi, Mali, Mexico, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, and Zambia. 
 
Proportional representation regimes (62 countries): 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, 
Moldova, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
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Table A2. Computation of the Human Development Index 
 
The Human Development Index combines following three dimensions: 
1. A long and healthy life: 
Life Expectancy Index (LEI) = (Life Expectancy at Birth-20)/(85-20) 
2. Being knowledgeable: 
Education Index (EI) = (MYSI+EYSI)/2 
2.1.  Mean Years of Schooling Index (MYSI) = Mean Years of Schooling/15 
2.2.  Expected Years of Schooling Index (MYSI) = Expected Years of Schooling/18 
3. A decent standard of living: 
Income Index (II) = [ln(GNIpc)-ln(100)]/[ln(75000)-ln(100)] 
Note: GNIpc is the gross national income per capita (in US dollars, PPP) 
HDI = (LEI*EI*II)
1/3
 
 
Source: Technical Notes, Human Development Report, United Nations Development Program 2014 (http://hdr.undp.org/en/data). 
 
 
Table A3. Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
      
HDI 4160 0.635 0.172 0.192 0.950 
HDI_gr 4025 0.799 0.887 -7.646 13.512 
Elect_yr 2380 0.257 0.437 0 1 
TimingElect 2242 0.642 0.281 0.091 1 
GovLeft 1924 0.354 0.478 0 1 
GovRight 1881 0.504 0.501 0 1 
GovMaj 2337 0.743 0.437 0 1 
GovCoal 2372 0.566 0.496 0 1 
MajCoal 2331 0.426 0.495 0 1 
Maj% 2354 57.711 15.101 9.278 100 
EcoRating 3778 33.780 7.180 0 50 
FinRating 3778 34.698 8.675 4 50 
PolRating 3778 64.303 15.146 9 97 
CompRating 3778 66.435 13.737 14 96 
Corruption 3795 3.004 1.354 0 6 
Democracy 2824 3.473 6.910 -10 10 
GovSize 2407 5.708 1.548 1.237 9.934 
Pop_gr 5241 1.665 1.529 -6.343 17.625 
Time 5447 28.081 9.978 1 34 
      
Notes: Data for 182 countries over the period 1980-2013; Due to missing values for some variables, the 
number of countries used in the estimations is reduced to 82. 
Sources: The data for HDI comes from the Human Development Report, United Nations Development 
Program 2014 (http://hdr.undp.org/en/data). The political variables were obtained from the Database of 
Political Institutions 2012, World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org) and Comparative Political Data Set I 
2013 (http://www.cpds-data.org/). The $Rating and Corruption variables come from the International Country 
Risk Guide (http://www.prsgroup.com). Democracy is the ‘polity2’ variable in the Polity IV Database. The 
GovSize is the ‘fi_sog’ index in the Economic Freedom of the World, Fraser Institute, 
(http://www.freetheworld.com/). The data for Pop_gr comes from the World Development Indicators, World 
Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/). 
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